A Winc Corp. v. Randy T. Simonsen LTD. and Simlew L.C. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
A Winc Corp. v. Randy T. Simonsen LTD. and
Simlew L.C. : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary A. Weston; Nielsen and Senior; Attorney for Appellee.
Reed M. Richards; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, A Winc Corp. v. Simonsen, No. 20030318 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4294
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AWINC CORP., an Oklahoma 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RANDY T. SIMONSEN; RANDY T. 
SMONSEN, LTD., a limited partnership; 
and SMLEW L.C., also known as 
SMLEW, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Case No. 20030318-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WASATCH COUNTY, 
HONORABLE DONALD J. EYRE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
REED M. RICHARDS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-0550 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
RANDY T. SIMONSEN 
RANDY T. SIMONSEN, LTD. 
SIMLEW L.C. 
GARY A. WESTON (#3435) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
53rd Park Plaza, Suite 400 
5217 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 327-8200 
Facsimile: (801) 327-8222 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
AWINC CORP. 
Oral Argument Requested 
4815-5848-8832 PE8722 002 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 1 2 2004 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AWINC CORP., an Oklahoma 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RANDY T. SIMONSEN; RANDY T. 
SIMONSEN, LTD., a limited partnership; 
and SMLEW L.C., also known as 
SMLEW, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
CaseNo.20030318-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WASATCH COUNTY, 
HONORABLE DONALD J. EYRE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
REED M. RICHARDS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-0550 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
RANDY T. SIMONSEN 
RANDY T. SIMONSEN, LTD. 
SIMLEW L.C. 
GARY A. WESTON (#3435) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
53rd Park Plaza, Suite 400 
5217 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 327-8200 
Facsimile: (801) 327-8222 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
AWINC CORP. 
Oral Argument Requested 
4815-5848-8832.PE8722.002 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
I. ISSUES 1 
H. STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 2 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
IN THE COURT BELOW 2 
H. STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
ARGUMENT 13 
I. APPELLANT, RANDY T. SMONSEN, LACKS STANDING TO PROSECUTE 
THIS CASE 14 
H. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF PUBLIC USE OF 
MIDDLE FORK ROAD 15 
UI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT MIDDLE FORK 
ROAD IS DEDICATED AND ABANDONED TO PUBLIC USE 19 
A. DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE OF THE POSTING OF NO TRESPASS 
SIGNS DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT MIDDLE FORK ROAD WAS A 
PRIVATE ROAD 21 
B. THE EVIDENCE, UNCONTRADICTED, WAS THAT THE GENERAL 
PUBLIC HAD CONTINUOUSLY USED MIDDLE FORK ROAD FOR 
MORE THAN A PERIOD OF TEN CONSECUTIVE YEARS 24 
4815-5848-8832.PE8722.002 1 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE 26 
CONCLUSION 31 
ADDENDUM 
Document Record page 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law R. 441 -449 
Judgment R. 450-452 
4815-5848-8832 PE8722 002 ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 Utah 14, 70 P.3d 35 
Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1 9<A, 1, 20, 21, 25, 2 ~ 2^  
Chapman v. Uintah County, 203 UT App. 383, 81 P.3d 761 . . 
Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. "80. S<> P W 5.^  > 2, 21 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995> ^ ^ 
Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1306 ^Utah Ct. App. 
Gurostieta v. Parkinson. 2000 I T 99. 17 P..V ^11^-
. . , . - . . - n ' . , / < • • • • 
//arrfzng- v. fle//, 2002 UT 108. 5~ P.3d 1093 . . . 
Harris v. IES Associates, Inc. _ • .* • \„h App. 112, 69 P.3d 297 .. 
Heath Techna Corporation v. Siiund Systems International, Inc., 588 l\2d 169 (Utah 1978, . . n 
Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1 9 9 ^ 
In Matter of the General Determination of Rights to I :sc W,ir, •> ' i r M T h " 
Utah Adv. Rep. 17 
Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978) 
438Main Street v ftnsv Heal hu- .. ?004 W|. ! S7<>598, (Lia.v l u 
RHNCorporation v. I'eitjeii, _;;04 i, . oO, % l!.3d 93 .^  . . 1 
Roderick v. ifcdfcy, 2002 Utah 84, 54 P.3d l u . i 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991) 
4815-5848-8832.PE8722.002 in 
Scharfv. BMG Corp, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985)) 18 
Shar's Cars, LLC. v. Elder, 2004 UT App. 258, 97 P.3d 724 19 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 1,2 
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981) 20 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) . . . 15, 21 
Yost v.. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981) 14 
Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, 979 P.2d 338 19 
Rules 
Utah R. App. P. 3(a) 1,14 
UtahR. App. P. 4(a) 1,14 
UtahR. App. P. 24(a)(9) 1,15 
UtahR. Civ. P. 17(a) 14 
UtahR. Civ. P. 52(a) 20, 27 
Utah R. Evid. 401 19 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (formerly Section 27-12-89) . .1 ,2 ,13,19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28 
4815-5848-8832.PE8722.002 -IV' 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment of the Fourth Judicial District, Wasatch 
County, entered by the Honorable Donald J. Eyre. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. ISSUES. 
1. Does Appellant, Randy T. Simonsen, lack standing to prosecute this appeal. 
[This issue first arises in the appeal and is not preserved in the trial court. The issue arises 
under rules 3(a) and 4(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.] 
2. Has Appellant failed to sufficiently marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's finding of public use of Middle Fork Road. 
[This issue first arises in the appeal and is not preserved in the trial court. This issue arises 
under rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.] 
3. Was it clearly erroneous for the court to have concluded, based upon the evidence, 
that Middle Fork Road was a public road dedicated and abandoned to the public in accordance 
with UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(1) and former § 27-12-89. 
[Issue preserved R. 481:103-110] 
n. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
1. Issue Nos. 1 and 2 arise in the appeal and do not require a review of the trial court. 
2. For issue no. 3, the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard resolving all disputes and evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's determination. RHN Corporation v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f22, 96 P.3d 935; State v. 
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Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994). The trial court's application of § 72-5-104(1), Utah 
Code Ann. to the facts as found is reviewed for correctness according the trial court discretion in 
its application of the Statute. In Matter of the General Determination of Rights to Use Water, 
2004 UT 67,143, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 17; Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, f 17, 80 P.3d 553; 
Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 807-808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1): 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89, effective until March 21,1998 when it was repealed and 
renumbered as § 72-5-104(1): 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN 
THE COURT BELOW. 
This action commenced seeking a determination that an unimproved mountain road in the 
Soldier Summit area of Wasatch County, Utah identified in the trial court as Middle Fork Road 
(hereinafter "Middle Fork Road") is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public within the 
contemplation and pursuant to the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 72-5-104(1) and its 
predecessor, § 27-12-89. The road crosses the Defendant's property (hereinafter "Defendant 
Property"), then a narrow strip of Uinta National Forest Land dividing the Defendant Property 
4815-5848-8832.PE8722.002 2 
and the land owned by the Plaintiff, AWINC Corp. (hereinafter "Plaintiff Property") and then 
continues through the Plaintiff Property and other Uinta National Forest land. 
Middle Fork Road was historically open and available to and used by members of the 
general public until Defendants Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C. acquired the 
Defendant Property in 1995. In 1996 or 1997 Defendants erected two gates across the road, one 
at the easterly boundary of the Defendant Property and the other at the southerly junction of the 
road with Left Fork Road. (R. 481:59). On November 24, 2000 AWINC filed this action against 
the Defendant Randy T. Simonsen (hereinafter "Mr. Simonsen") in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Wasatch County, Utah, Civil No. 000500472, seeking determination of a prescriptive 
easement over Middle Fork Road as it crossed the Defendant Property, trespass damages for 
erecting the gates and for an injunction prohibiting the maintenance of the gates in a closed and 
locked condition preventing use of the road. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff on 
September 11, 2001 filed an amended complaint adding additional defendants, Randy T. 
Simonsen, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership and Simlew L.C, a Utah limited liability company 
and raising an additional claim for judgment declaring that Middle Fork Road is a public road. 
(R.51). 
On January 27, 28 and 29, 2003, the case was tried to the Honorable Donald J. Eyre 
sitting without jury. (R. 404-07). Upon Plaintiff closing the presentation of its case without 
proffering any evidence as to damages or a private prescriptive easement, the court dismissed 
those claims and reserved to the completion of the trial the claim seeking judgment declaring that 
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Middle Fork Road was a public road and the claim for injunctive relief directed at Defendants' 
gates on the road. (R. 480:59-60). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court found that the general public had free and 
unlimited access and ability to use Middle Fork Road and had done so for a period of more than 
ten consecutive years prior to the erection and placement of Defendants' gates and whenever they 
found it necessary or convenient limited only by prevailing weather conditions. Accordingly, 
the trial court declared Middle Fork Road is a public road dedicated and abandoned to the public 
in accordance with § 72-5-104(1), Utah Code Ann. and directed that Defendants forthwith 
remove or cause to be removed the locks from the gate at the junction of Middle Fork Road and 
Left Fork Road. The court permanently enjoined Defendants from maintaining any gate across 
Middle Fork Road in a closed and locked condition and from obstructing or preventing access by 
the public to the use of the road as it courses on and over the Defendant Property. (R. 441-449). 
Judgment was accordingly entered on March 10, 2003 (R. .452). 
On April 7, 2003 a notice of appeal was filed on behalf of Randy T. Simonsen (R. 454). 
No notice of appeal was filed or taken by either of the other two defendants. Notwithstanding, the 
Brief of the Appellant is filed with this Court on behalf of all three Defendants. Subsequent to 
the filing of the notice of appeal, and on July 11, 2003 the Defendants filed a motion to stay 
enforcement of judgment. (R. 462) and Plaintiff filed its memorandum in opposition (R. 472). 
Defendants did not submit the motion for decision and the trial court has not ruled on the motion. 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. On or about February 25, 1997, Plaintiff received a deed, to the Plaintiff Property. 
The property consists of patented mining claims in the mountain area of Soldier Summit, 
Wasatch County, Utah. A portion of the property is located northeasterly of what is commonly 
known as Soldier Summit and which is in the Southeast 1/4 of Section 18, part of Section 17, and 
part of the South lA of Section 8 in Township 10 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian. (R. 448). 
2. In September 1995, Defendants, Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C., 
acquired certain land ("Defendant Property"), a portion of which is located in the North lA of 
Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 7 East, and the North lA of Section 18, Township 10 
South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. (R.448), 
3. Both the Plaintiff Property and the Defendant Property lie adjacent to and are 
separated by United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service lands being within the 
boundaries of the Uinta National Forest, as shown by year 1975 Uinta National Forest map, 
Exhibit No. 5, year 1993 Uinta National Forest Service map, Exhibit No. 9, and year 1998 United 
States Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey map, Exhibit No. 10. (Exhibits 5, 9 
and 10). 
4. Both the Plaintiff Property and the Defendant Property are accessed by Middle 
Fork Road the general course of which is shown in part as a four-wheel drive road on the 1998 
U.S. Geological Survey map, Exhibit 10, and on the 1993 Uinta National Forest Service map, 
Exhibit 9, in part as unimproved Road 900 and in part as unimproved Road 218. The road is 
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accessed at its far south end by Left Fork Road and at its north end by a U.S. Forest Service trail 
identified in the trial court as Crossover Road. Middle Fork Road courses across a portion of the 
Defendant Property and the Plaintiff Property and is more particularly described as follows: 
That currently existing unimproved mountain road, 10 feet in width, commencing 
at the intersection of Left Fork Road and what is sometimes known as Middle 
Fork Road, in Wasatch County, Utah, and which intersection is in either the 
Northeast 1/4 of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 7 East, or the Northwest 
1/4 of Section 18, Township 10 South, Range 8 East, SLB&M, and running 
northeasterly, then southeasterly, then southerly, then again southeasterly, and 
then again northeasterly across portions of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 
7 East and Sections 18, 17 and 8 of Township 10 South, Range 8 East, SLB&M, 
to the northerly boundary of the Plaintiff Property. (R. 447). 
5. In 1996, Defendants erected and placed a metal gate across Middle Fork Road at 
the road's intersection with Left Fork Road. ("The Gate")- Continuously since that time, 
Defendants have maintained The Gate in a closed and locked condition, thereby prohibiting 
access through The Gate from and to Middle Fork Road except with permission of the 
Defendants. (R. 480:223). 
6. In 1997, Defendants caused a fence to be constructed at a distance of 
approximately 200 feet on each side of The Gate. (R. 480:184-185). 
7. Defendants denied Plaintiff access through The Gate except upon the condition 
that Plaintiff relinquish any right to such access. (R. 446). 
8. In 1997, a fence wire drop gate ("Livestock Gate") was constructed by Mr. Don 
Blanchard, at the direction of the Defendants, across Middle Fork Road at the approximate 
location where the road crosses the easterly-most boundary of the Defendant Property. (R. 
480:183; 481:59-60). 
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9. Commencing sometime in the time frame of the 1960s and continuing to the time 
of the 1995 acquisition of the Defendant Property by Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C, 
the Defendant Property or portions thereof were leased for sheep grazing purposes. One or more 
of those lessees had placed along Left Fork Road rocks and tires on which had been painted 
words declaring "No Trespass." Such were also placed in the general area where Middle Fork 
Road accessed Left Fork Road and upon Middle Fork Road in that general area, but did not 
prevent or halt public use of Middle Fork Road. (R. 446). 
10. Beginning in 1995 and continuing to the time of trial, Defendants posted the 
Defendant Property with signs declaring "No Trespass" and prohibited use of that portion of 
Middle Fork Road coursing across the Defendant Property, except with permission of the 
Defendants. (R. 446). 
11. Beginning in 1997 and continuing to the time of trial, the Plaintiff posted the 
Plaintiff Property with signs declaring "No Trespass." Plaintiff did not restrict use of Middle 
Fork Road as it crosses over the Plaintiff Property, but rather prohibited use of the adjacent 
Plaintiff Property except by permission, which permission was from time to time given to various 
persons requesting permission to hunt wild game on the property. (R. 479:112-113, 129-130). 
12. Cullen Goodwin, David Ellis, Fred Addis and Kenneth Earle all testified for the 
Plaintiff with respect to the use of Middle Fork Road by they, friends and members of their 
respective families over a period of many years. 
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13. Cullen Goodwin testified: 
a. He and members of his family and other persons accompanying him from 
time to time had used the Middle Fork area each year since 1965 for hunting, fishing and 
sightseeing and in so doing would be in the area eight to ten times a years from May to 
November totaling forty-five to fifty days per year. (R. 479:9-12, 71). During the time he 
neither owned or leased any property in the area. (R. 479:11, 65). During the time he 
would be on Middle Fork Road thirty to forty times each year. (R. 479:70-71). He 
operated pickup trucks, motorcycles and four wheel all terrain vehicles along the road 
(R.479:29, 68-69, 75). and frequently saw other persons using the road. (R. 479:29-30, 
85-86). Prior to the installation of the Defendant's gates he would drive the entire length 
of the road extending from Left Fork Road to the south to Crossover Road on the north. 
(R. 479:31-32). At no time did anyone tell him that he could not use Middle Fork Road 
or that it was a private road. (R. 479:32). He never saw signs along the road declaring 
the road to be private and understood that it was in fact a public road. (R 479:32-33, 51-
52). In 1997 he first encountered The Gate at the junction of Middle Fork Road and Left 
Fork Road (R. 479:33). Because of that gate and the Livestock Gate he had not, for the 
last six years, used the portion of the road extending between the two gates. (R. 479:36-
37, 79). The Gate at the intersection of Middle Fork Road and Left Road was locked. (R. 
479:38). 
Mr. Goodwin testified that the video which he had taken of that portion of Middle Fork 
Road extending from the Livestock Gate at the easterly boundary of the Defendant Property and 
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extending northerly to Crossover Road showed the physical condition and circumstance of that 
portion of the road. (R. 479:42-50; Exh. 2). He testified that before Plaintiffs acquisition of the 
Plaintiff Property and upon learning that a certain tract comprising a portion of what would be 
that property, was owned by a Mr. Marson that he sought and obtained permission from Mr. 
Marson to hunt the area of the Marson property (R. 479:60-62). After the Plaintiff Property was 
acquired by Plaintiff, he obtained the permission of Plaintiff to hunt the Plaintiff Property with 
family and hunting companions, paid a fee for that right and performed certain environmental 
restoration upon the property to make it more suitable for hunting. (R. 479:51, 55-56, 62, 65-66). 
He did not ever seek nor was he ever given permission to use Middle Fork Road. (R. 479:32-33, 
51-52). 
14. David Ellis Testified: 
a. That Mr. Goodwin acquainted him with the Middle Fork Area and in 1977 
or 1978 he began hunting, fishing, camping and hiking in the area. (R. 479:206-207). He 
has so hunted and used the area every year except for 1998 and 2001. (R. 479:207). He 
has never owned or leased any property in that area. (R. 479:208). In using Middle Fork 
Road, he believed it to be a public road, never asked for permission to use the road nor 
has such use been denied him. (R. 479:219-220). His annual use of the area began in the 
latter part of May. He last used the area each year in the month of November. His use 
took him into the area five to eight times a year consisting of twenty days or more each 
year. (R. 479:210-211). During those times he operated pickup trucks and four wheel all 
terrain vehicles over Middle Fork Road and saw other people using the road. 
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(R. 479:208, 211-212, 214, 217-218, 220-222). He drove the full length of the road until 
he encountered Defendant's gates in 1997. (R. 479:214-216). The last time he was on 
the full length of the road it was passable with a pickup truck. (R. 479:217-218). He 
originally believed that all of the property was BLM or Forest Service property. He then 
along with Mr. Goodwin learned that a portion was owned by Mr. Marson and so 
obtained permission to hunt that portion of the property that Mr. Marson owned. 
Thereafter, upon AWINC's acquisition of the Plaintiff Property, he joined with Mr. 
Goodwin in obtaining permission to hunt the Plaintiff Property. (R. 479:223-224). 
15. Fred Addis testified: 
a. He began hunting in the Middle Fork area in 1965 and has hunted in that 
area each year since that time. He started camping in the area in or before 1988. (R. 
480:7-8, 25). He was hunting in the area six times a year from 1965 through the 1970?s 
and later in the 1980's and 1990's fifteen to twenty times a year amounting to some fifty 
to sixty days a year. (R. 480:8-9, 26-27). His first trips into the area would begin in May 
and his last trips in October. (R. 480:9). He never owned or leased any land in the area. 
(R. 480:7). He operated trucks, jeeps and all terrain vehicles along Middle Fork Road 
during those occasions and recalls that his last use of the two wheel drive truck on the 
road was probably in 1974 or 1975. (R. 480:12-13). He operated a four wheel drive 
truck along the road until the time Defendants' gates were erected. (R. 480:14). 
Mr. Addis believed the property along Middle Fork Road was public property 
until Defendants put the chain around The Gate. (R. 480:14, 36). During his trips to the 
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area he would use Middle Fork Road daily and continued to do so until the year that 
Defendant's gates were erected on the road. (R. 480:16). In using the road he saw people 
on the road with whom he was not acquainted. (R. 480:17). No one ever told him that he 
needed permission to use Middle Fork Road (R. 480:22). During the years that he used 
the road he observed that it had never been maintained but remained at a width often to 
twelve feet. (R. 480:18). Before Defendants acquired the Defendant Property, he saw 
two camp trailers every year along Middle Fork Road and saw camps consisting of tents 
or trailers in the general area. (R. 480:23-24). In 2002 he asked and secured permission 
to hunt the Plaintiff Property. (R. 480:20). 
16. Kenneth Earle testified: 
a. He began camping in the Middle Fork area with his father and his father's 
family in the late 1940's or early 1950fs. (R. 480:39). He has camped in the area for 
hunting, fishing or general relaxation purposes every year since the mid 1970fs, usually 
with his family and also with friends from California. (R. 480:40, 56). He has never 
owned or leased property in the Middle Fork area. (R. 480:39). During the 1960fs and 
1970fs he was there at least twice a year and in the last twenty years at least three to four 
times a year hunting and another four to five times a year camping. (R. 480:40). 
Typically in any given year he is first in the area around July 4th and last in the area in late 
October. (R. 480:41). 
Mr. Earl testified that when in the area for hunting purposes he is usually there for 
a week at a time. In the summertime when only camping he is generally there three to 
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four days on each occasion totaling some fifteen to twenty-five days per year. (R. 
480:43). He would not use Middle Fork Road every trip but occasionally and estimates at 
least two or three times a year he would travel its entire length from Left Fork Road to 
Crossover Road using four wheel drive recreational vehicles. (R. 480:44-45). He camped 
along Middle Fork Road, including in 1991 (R. 480:45-47, 49) and saw people both using 
and camping along the road. He never was asked not to use the road. (R. 480: 48-49, 51-
52, 57). Before The Gate was erected he and his companions used the entire length of 
Middle Fork Road. (R. 480:48-50). He never asked permission to use Middle Fork Road 
and found it always to be a "wide open" road. (R. 480:51). 
17. The uncontradicted evidence received by the trial court was that prior to the 
placement of The Gate and the Livestock Gate, the Middle Fork Road was accessible to and 
used by the general public. It was so accessible and used by motor vehicles until the early 1990's 
when the United States Forest Service placed wood posts in the road at or northerly of the north 
boundary of the Plaintiff Property to restrict use on Forest Service land to only trail bikes or four 
wheel all terrain vehicles. (R. 479:27-29). 
18. No evidence was introduced of signs placed in or along Middle Fork Road prior to 
the Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C. acquisition of Defendant Property declaring the 
road to have been private or that use of the road was prohibited or available only with 
permission. 
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19. The Gate and the Livestock Gate prevented public use of that portion of Middle 
Fork Road which courses on and over Defendant Property. The gates were intended by 
Defendants to prevent such use. 
20. Before the erection of the gates, members of the general public driving motor 
vehicles on Middle Fork Road did so openly and notoriously and the then owners of Defendant 
Property knew or should have known of said open and notorious use. (R. 480:69-70,110, 125, 
177,214-216,223). 
21. Prior to the installation of The Gate, the general public had free and unlimited 
access and the ability to drive motor vehicles along the entire length of Middle Fork Road as 
limited by weather conditions. They were not doing so pursuant to permission requested or 
obtained from owners of the Defendant Property or of the Plaintiff Property. 
ARGUMENT 
Randy T. Simonsen, the Appellant in this case, lacks standing to prosecute this appeal. 
He has not sufficiently marshaled the evidence supporting the trial courts finding that Middle 
Fork Road is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-5-104(1) and its predecessor, § 27-12-89 and has not shown that the trial courts 
finding is clearly erroneous or that its application of the law is incorrect. 
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I. APPELLANT, RANDY T. SIMONSEN, LACKS STANDING TO 
PROSECUTE THIS CASE. 
Of the three defendants before the trial court, only Mr. Simonsen filed a notice of appeal. 
(R..454). The Docketing Statement filed in the Supreme Court of Utah relative to the appeal 
identifies Mr. Simonsen as the only appellant. However, Mr. Simonsen does not hold title to any 
portion of the Defendant Property over which Middle Fork Road courses, and neither holds or 
claims any title in or to the property or road. Title is held in Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew 
L.C. (R. 51, Amended Complaint fflflO, 11 and 12; 57, Answer to Amended Complaint j^f7 and 
8). Having no title or protectable interest in the Defendant Property or the road Mr. Simonsen is 
not a real party in interest with regard to this appeal. The Defendants who are the real parties in 
interest are Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C. neither of which has filed either the notice 
of appeal or the docketing statement as necessary to perfect an appeal. There can be no right to 
appeal the trial court judgment absent a timely filing of the notice of appeal as required by Rules 
3(a) and 4(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The filing of the notice of appeal is necessary 
to give this Court jurisdiction. See Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99,1(19, 17 P.3d 1110; 
Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 1981). 
"Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Rule 17(a) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. " . . . [0]ne must be personally adversely affected before he has 
standing to prosecute an action,..." Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978). The lack 
of standing is jurisdictional. Heath Techna Corporation v. Sound Systems International, Inc., 
588 P.2d 169, 170 (Utah 1978). 
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Mr. Simonsen is not the real party in interest and is without right to prosecute this appeal. 
II. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF 
PUBLIC USE OF MIDDLE FORK ROAD. 
Simonsen has not met his burden of marshaling all of the evidence in support of the trial 
courts finding that Middle Fork Road has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period often years. "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding." Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This 
court has said: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. 
The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
[trial] court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct App. 1991) 
(Emphasis added). 
The following evidence supporting the trial court's finding has neither been marshaled 
nor addressed by Appellant. 
1. David Ellis testified that he spent twenty days or more a year in the Middle Fork 
area (R. 479:211) and that not only had he never owned but also had never leased property in the 
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area. (R. 479:208). Further, he testified that when he last used Middle Fork Road in 1997, it was 
passable to a pickup truck going in the north to south direction. (R. 479:215, 217-218). 
2. Fred Addis testified that while he was in the Middle Fork area fifteen to twenty 
times a year in the 1980's and 1990's (all as recounted by Appellant), that previously from 1965 
to the 1970's he was in that area six times a year. (R. 480:8-9). He further testified that he was in 
the Middle Fork area between fifty and sixty days a year (R. 480:9) and in fact used Middle Fork 
Road on a daily basis during that time. (R. 480:16). 
3. Kenneth Earl testified that in the last twenty years he has been in the Middle Fork 
area at least seven to nine times a year comprising a total of fifteen to twenty-five days per year. 
(R. 480:40, 43). 
4. Cullen Goodwin testified that he had never leased property in the Middle Fork 
area (R. 479:11). 
5. William Irving, Defendants' witness, testified that during the time that the 
Defendant Property was owned by Mr. Irving's company and then later by Mr. Irving himself in 
1988, he determined that public access was a problem. (R. 480:64-67, 69-70). He did not do 
anything personally to keep people off of Middle Fork Road (R. 480:73-74, 83). 
6. In deposition testimony, Defendants' witness Orrin Jackson said that he had not 
been in the Middle Fork area since 1980. (R. 480: 103-104). 
7. Mr. Simonsen testified that he was first on the Defendant Property in 1995, and 
then observed that the general public was using portions of the property and Middle Fork Road. 
(R. 480:165, 214-217). 
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8. Exhibit 4, a copy of the 1978 U.S. Department of Interior U.S. Geological Survey 
Map identifies the general location of Middle Fork Road as a jeep trail. Such is evidence that the 
then existence and circumstances of the road was sufficient to be recorded on the official map of 
the United States Department of the Interior. (Exhibit 4; R. 479:105-106). 
9. Exhibit 5, a copy of the 1975 United States Department of Agriculture Uinta 
National Forest Map identifies the general location of Middle Fork Road as a trail. Such is 
evidence that the then existence and circumstances of the road was sufficient to be recorded on 
the official map of the United States Department of Agriculture. (Exhibit 5; R. 479:175-176). 
10. Exhibit 9, the 1993 United States Department of Agriculture Uinta National 
Forest Map identifies the general location of Middle Fork Road as an unimproved road. Such is 
evidence that the then existence and circumstances of the road was sufficient to be recorded on 
the official map of the United States Department of Agriculture. (Exhibit 9; R. 479:176-177). 
11. Exhibit 10, the 1998 U.S. Department of Interior U.S. Geological Survey Map 
identifies the general location of Middle Fork Road as a 4 wheel drive road. Such is evidence 
that the then existence and circumstances of the road was sufficient to be recorded on the official 
map of the United States Department of the Interior. On the Exhibit, Middle Fork Road is 
marked with a pink line, Left Fork Road with a blue line, Crossover Road with a green line and 
Right Fork Road with a yellow line. (Exhibit 10; R. 479:15-16, 24). 
12. Exhibit 11, the September 18,1984 United States Department of Agriculture 
aerial photograph of the junction of Middle Fork Road and Left Fork Road and the continuance 
of Middle Fork Road through the Defendant Property, a portion of the Uinta National Forest land 
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and into the Plaintiff Property. The Exhibit is evidence of the actual location of Middle Fork 
Road and of its September 1984 condition and circumstance. (Exhibit 11; R. 479:19-20, 22, 24). 
13. Exhibit 12, the September 27,1998 United States Department of Agriculture 
aerial photograph of the junction of Middle Fork Road and Left Fork Road and the continuance 
of Middle Fork Road through the Defendant Property, a portion of the Uinta National Forest land 
and into the Plaintiff Property. The Exhibit is evidence of the actual location of Middle Fork 
Road and of its September 27,1998 condition and circumstance. (Exhibit 12; R. 479:22, 24). 
14. Exhibit 2, the Cullen Goodwin September 3, 2002 video tape of that portion of 
Middle Fork Road lying northeasterly of the Defendant Property. The same is evidence of the 
circumstance and condition of that portion of Middle Fork Road. (R. 479:41-50). 
Mr. Simonsen is required to marshal "every scrap" of evidence that may support the trial 
court's findings subject of the appeal. If that requirement to marshal is not met, then this court 
assumes that the record supports the finding of the trial court. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, 
Inc., 2004 WL 1879598, 1J69 (Utah). The court then "proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the 
lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (citing Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989) and Scharfv. BMG Corp, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). 
If Mr. Simonsen by chance contends that the non-marshaled evidence was irrelevant, then 
he has the burden of proving lack of relevancy. Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, ^ 21, 57 P.3d 
1093. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
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without the evidence." Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence. The evidence not marshaled by Mr. 
Simonsen made more probable the trial court's determination that the public used Middle Fork 
Road and that the use was continuous for more than ten years. The relevance of the evidence 
cannot be disputed. Mr. Simonsen has failed to meet his obligation to marshal the evidence. As 
a consequence, he has failed to meet his burden on appeal and this court must assume that the 
evidence adequately supported the finding of fact which Mr. Simonsen attacks. Shar's Cars, 
L.L.C. v. Elder, 2004 UT App. 258,131; 97 P.3d 724; Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, pO, 979 
P.2d338. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT MIDDLE 
FORK ROAD IS DEDICATED AND ABANDONED TO PUBLIC USE. 
From the evidence, the trial court made its findings of fact and thereupon, its conclusions 
of law. It concluded: 
Middle Fork Road is a public road dedicated and abandoned to the public in 
accordance with § 72-5-104(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953, and its predecessor, § 27-
12-89, Utah Code Ann.. 1953. (R. 442). 
Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was applicable in 1996 and until March 
21, 1998, when it was repealed and renumbered as Section 72-5-104(1). See L 1998, Ch. 270 § 
132. Section 72-5-104(1) was amended effective March 16, 2000, substituting "is" for "shall be 
deemed to have been." See L. 2000, Ch. 324 § 7. 
Section 72-5-104(1) reads: 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has 
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years. 
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Former § 27-12-89 reads: 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years. 
In Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court, 
construing former Section 27-12-89, ruled that, thereunder, only three factors must be found 
present in order for a road to become a public highway or thoroughfare, those being: 
1. A continuous use. 
2. As a public thoroughfare. 
3. For a period of ten years. 
In this case each of those factors has been established by the evidence. "Once the technical 
provisions of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is a 'public highway.' The Court has no 
discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell, at 808 (citing Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 
307, 313 (Utah 1997)). When the Court determines each of the three factors to be present, the 
dedication of the road as a public thoroughfare is established as a matter of law. Thurman v. 
Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). 
Pursuant to Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[findings of fact,... shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses," Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 
2003 Utah 14, f 2, 70 P.3d 35, (citing Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 Utah 84, | 2 , 54 P.3d 1119). This 
Court in Harris v. IES Associates, Inc., 2003 Utah App. 112, p i , 69 P.3d 297, held: 
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To properly challenge a finding, the complaining party must "marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding" and "then show that this same 
finding is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, 
thus making it clearly erroneous." (Citing West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 
818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
The trial court was required to apply § 72-5-104(1), Utah Code Ann. to the facts as found. 
In doing so it concluded that Middle Fork Road was dedicated to the use of the public. The 
application of the statute to the facts found by the trial court, raises a mixed question of fact and 
law and consequently, this Court reviews that decision for correctness, but granting the trial court 
discretion in its application of the facts to the statutory requirements. In the Matter of the 
General Determination of Rights to Use Water, 2004 UT 67, f43, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 17; Covey 
v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, f 17, 80 P.3d 553; Campbell at 807-808. 
Mr. Simonsen has not shown any fatal flaw in the evidence and is unable to show that the 
trial court did not correctly apply the statute to the facts as found.. 
A. DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE OF THE POSTING OF NO TRESPASS 
SIGNS DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT MIDDLE FORK ROAD WAS A 
PRIVATE ROAD. 
Mr. Simonsen contends the posting of no trespass signs was sufficient to demonstrate that 
Middle Fork Road could not be continuously used by the public and absent that continuous use, 
the court erred in determining the road was abandoned to the public. However, Defendant's 
evidence was neither relevant nor sufficient. The issue is not whether the Defendant Property 
was privately owned but whether Middle Fork Road is a private road. Plaintiffs witnesses 
testified that they did not see any no trespass signs along Middle Fork Road. The fact of the 
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matter is that there was no evidence of any such signs. Defendants' evidence had only to do with 
signs posted along Left Fork Road and at that road's junction with Middle Fork Road. In fact 
Mr. Simonsen testified that he had signs posted along Left Fork Road because he considered it to 
be the "main road" and "felt there should be no travel off of the Left Fork Road." (R. 480:176). 
There was no evidence that Defendants' predecessors in interest had placed no trespass signs 
either beyond that point or anywhere along Middle Fork Road. 
The evidence shows that before Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C. acquired the 
Defendant Property in 1995, the only signs arguably directed at the general public were writings 
on rocks and on tires along Left Fork Road and at its junction with Middle Fork Road. 
Defendants did not contend that Left Fork Road was anything other than a public road. The 
placement of signs along that road was to preclude users of the road from exiting on to what 
would later become the Defendant Property. The fact of the matter is that there is no evidence 
that any sign had been placed specifically declaring that Middle Fork Road was a private road, 
declaring that permission was required to use the road or prohibiting its use. 
Defendants produced only two witnesses that declared that before 1995, they had elected 
not to use Middle Fork Road believing that use of the road was prohibited. Those witnesses were 
David Cunningham and Donald Blanchard. David Cunningham testified that in 1987, 1988 and 
1993 he did see no trespass signs along Left Fork Road and at its junction with Middle Fork 
Road. The signs were written on rocks and on a tire hanging in a tree. (R. 481:27-29, 31-32). In 
1994 he accompanied William Irving along Middle Fork Road from its juncture with Left Fork 
Road northeasterly across Defendant Property, the Forest Service land and the Plaintiff Property 
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to Crossover Road. He did not then see any no trespass signs along Middle Fork Road. Again, 
the only such signs he saw were at the junction of Left Fork Road and Middle Fork Road. (R. 
481:35,39-40). 
Donald Blanchard also testified that he was on the Left Fork Road sometime from 1988 
to the early 1990's and also then saw signs such as "keep out" or "no trespassing" marked on 
some rocks and tires. (R. 481: 47-49). However, he was not on Middle Fork Road until 1995. 
(R. 481:51, 59), He assisted with the construction in 1996 of The Gate and in 1997 with the 
placement of the Livestock Gate. (R. 481:52-53, 59). 
The other witnesses testifying on behalf of the Defendants consisted of a prior owner of 
the Defendant Property, sheepmen leasing the property years earlier and friends and family of 
Mr. Simonsen using the property with Defendants' permission. Of those individuals, all were on 
the Defendant Property after its acquisition by the Defendants excepting William Irving and 
sheepmen Orrin and Joseph Jackson none of whom gave evidence of having posted no trespass 
signs on Middle Fork Road. Orrin Jackson and Joseph Jackson told of attempting to stop the 
public from using what is now the Defendant Property during the time that they were herding 
sheep on the property. Orrin Jackson testified that he had not been on the property since 1980. 
There is no evidence of any constant continuous posting of no trespass signs on the 
Defendant Property let alone on Middle Fork Road. We have testimony of attempts in early 
years by Orrin Jackson and Joseph Jackson attempting to place logs at or across Middle Fork 
Road at its exit from Left Fork Road. However, they are the same witnesses who testified that at 
that time there was no Middle Fork Road at all, but only a trail for animals. (R. 480:95-96, 98, 
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122-123). Defendants evidence focused on intermittent and occasional sign postings along Left 
Fork Road and at its junction with Middle Fork Road. There was no testimony with regard to 
such postings on Middle Fork Road. Such explains why Messrs. Goodwin, Ellis, Addis and Earl 
did not see such signs along the road. Members of the general public had continuously used 
Middle Fork Road before 1995 without any responsible notice that someone was claiming that 
the road was private and not available to public use. 
B. THE EVIDENCE, UNCONTRADICTED, WAS THAT THE GENERAL 
PUBLIC HAD CONTINUOUSLY USED MIDDLE FORK ROAD FOR 
MORE THAN A PERIOD OF TEN CONSECUTIVE YEARS. 
The evidence demonstrated that members of the general public have been using Middle 
Fork Road prior to the Defendants' gates erected in 1996 and 1997 for consecutive years far in 
excess of the ten years which the trial court determined met the requirements of §§ 27-12-89 and 
72-5-105(1) Utah Code Ann. The undisputed testimony was that the Middle Fork area and road 
were used each and every year during the season that weather permitted. Cullen Goodwin, David 
Ellis, Fred Addis, Kenneth Earl and their respective accompaniment of family and friends first 
used the same in May and lastly in October or November. They did so each and every 
consecutive year beginning as early as the late 1940's or early 1950's with regard to Kenneth Earl, 
1965 as testified to by Cullen Goodwin and Fred Addis and as recently as either 1977 or 1978 
with regard to David Ellis. That use was at a minimum of some eighteen years and at a 
maximum of some fifty years before Defendants gated the road. 
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Each of the witnesses testified that they did not use the road every day. "Under Utah law, 
use need not be regular to be continuous. Even infrequent use can result in dedication of a road 
as a public thoroughfare. However, under the continuous use requirement, members of the 
public must have been able to use the road whenever they found it necessary or convenient." 
Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d at 809. See e.g. Chapman v. Uintah County, 203 UT 
App. 383, ^22, 81 P.3d 761; Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d at 311. 
There is no evidence at all that prior to Defendants' installation of the gates, Middle Fork 
Road was used only by persons having an ownership in what is now the Defendant Property or 
who used the road only by permission. Unable to show that Messrs. Goodwin, Ellis, Addis and 
Earl had not used the property for more than the requisite ten consecutive years, Mr. Simonsen 
declares that notwithstanding, they were not members of the general public because they were 
using "the area" by private right or with self serving or special interests in the road. That position 
is not supported by the evidence and is not factual. Each of the four testified that he had never 
owned or leased property in the are of Middle Fork Road and that prior to Defendants' gates, had 
never been denied use of the road and had never requested permission for that use. Rather, they 
believed the road to be a public road. There is no evidence whatsoever that any of them were 
using the road with permission. Clearly, permissive use by one claiming title to the road or the 
right to regulate passage there over, cannot result in a dedication of the road for public purposes. 
"[C]ase law has distinguished between use of a road by owners of adjoining property and by the 
general public. 'Such property owners cannot be considered members of the public generally, as 
that term generally is used in dedication by user statutes.' This is because adjoining owners 
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may have documentary or prescriptive rights to use the road or their use may be by permission of 
the owners of the fee of the road." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 
(Utah 1995) (internal citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs witnesses testified they obtained permission originally from Mr. Marson and 
then later from Plaintiff to hunt on a portion of what is now the Plaintiff Property. They testified 
that a fee was from time to time paid for that hunting privilege. However, those hunting 
privileges were requested and secured at the earliest, some ten or twelve years before trial or in 
other words, in the time frame of 1991 to 1993. (R. 479:60). And yet as of that time, Mr. Ellis 
had been using Middle Fork Road for at least thirteen years and Messrs. Goodwin, Addis and 
Earl for some twenty-five years. Clearly, the ten year continuous use requirement of §§ 27-12-89 
and 72-5-104(1) was by then satisfied. However once again, and more importantly, the 
permission on which Mr. Simonsen focuses was not for use of Middle Fork Road but for hunting 
privileges on a portion of Plaintiff Property. Each of Plaintiff s witnesses were members of the 
general public and their testimony evidenced the continuous availability of the road for public 
use and restricted only by climate conditions during certain seasons of the year. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Simonsen does not declare with which of the trial court's twenty-five separate 
findings of fact he is in disagreement. Notwithstanding, it would appear that the finding for 
which he claims there is not evidentiary support is finding number 24 which reads as follows: 
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The general public has made use of Middle Fork Road as a public thoroughfare 
prior to the erection and placement of The Gate for a period of more than ten 
consecutive years. Said use was continuous during said period of time in that the 
^ public used the road whenever they found it necessary or convenient and use was 
limited only by prevailing weather conditions. (R. 443). 
Mr. Simonsen declares that "[t]he trial court decided this case with insufficient evidence 
to meet the clear and convincing burden of proof required." Memorandum, p.32. The elements 
of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) and 27-12-89 must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1099; Campbell v. Box Elder County, 
962 P.2d at 808. Here, the trial court clearly recognized the requisite standard of proof in 
declaring its conclusion of law number 3 that: 
Plaintiff is the party responsible to prove that Middle Fork Road has been 
dedicated as a public thoroughfare. The showing must be by clear and convincing 
evidence. (R. 442). 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court did not find Plaintiffs 
evidence to be "clear and convincing." The court identified the burden of persuasion which it 
had required of Plaintiff. Obviously, it found that the burden had been met. The trial court was 
in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented. 
Plaintiffs burden of proof was a matter for the trial court to weigh in determining the 
persuasiveness of Plaintiff s evidence. It obviously did so. This Court in Embassy Group, Inc. v. 
Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), applying Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), addressed the clear 
and convincing burden of proof on a Plaintiffs fraud claim. The trial court had found there to 
have been no factual basis for the claim of fraud. In addressing the trial court's finding the Court 
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said "[t]his court must give 'due regard' to a trial court's determinations of credibility." Id. at 
1371 
The enhanced burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the dedication of 
Middle Fork Road does not suggest alone require this Court to conclude that the trial court either 
should not nor could not have found that burden of persuasion was met. 
In Campbell this Court addressing a trial court's responsibility in determining whether a 
road had been dedicated to public use under § 27-12-89, Utah Code Ann. ruled: 
. . . a trial court must make initial fact findings and then apply the law to those fact 
findings to determine whether they meet the statutory guidelines for public 
dedication. We review this ultimate determination, which is a mixed question of 
fact and law, for correctness. However, we grant the trial court significant 
discretion in its application of the facts to section 27-12-89 requirements because 
"its legal requirements, other than the ten year requirement, are highly fact 
dependent and somewhat amorphous." 
Campbell 962 P.2d at 807-808 (internal citation omitted). 
All evidence presented with regard to the use of Middle Fork Road prior to the erection of 
Defendants' gates clearly demonstrated that the road had been open and available for use by the 
general public. No witness testified of attempting to use the road during that time frame but 
having use denied by any person. Testimony of Messrs. Goodwin, Ellis, Addis and Earl showed 
that Middle Fork Road was then freely available for use by anyone and that the only restriction 
on use was that imposed by climate conditions dictated by the various seasons of the year. The 
evidence was clear and unavoidably convincing. Defendants did not attempt to meet that 
evidence with the testimony of any person declaring that during that time they had been refused 
use of the road. Consequently, Mr. Simonsen now seeks to oppose the sufficiency of the 
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evidence by declaring that because Messrs. Goodwin, Ellis, Addis and Earl were only four 
individuals that they were not a sufficient number and therefore their testimony did not 
sufficiently demonstrate use by the public at large. 
Mr. Simonsen, of course, does not say what number of persons he believes would 
sufficiently document the public experience nor does he tell us why he did not elicit the 
testimony of any such others. Rather, he contends that because the four had later on secured 
permission to hunt portions of what is now the Plaintiff Property such made their use of Middle 
Fork Road other than open and hostile and so not sufficient to represent a use by members of the 
general public. Then, he points to evidence of signs intended to restrict or prohibit use. Once 
again, however, the signage was only along Left Fork Road and at its junction with Middle Fork 
Road and was directed at precluding use not of the road, but of what is now the Defendant 
Property adjacent to the road. 
The only evidence of attempts to bar the use of Middle Fork Road itself prior to 
Defendants' acquisition of the Defendant Property, was the testimony of Orrin Jackson and 
Joseph Jackson. However, both of them contend that there was no Middle Fork Road or trail and 
that what is now Middle Fork Road then consisted only of an animal trail over which motor 
vehicles could not have been operated without damage to the vehicle. Again, Mr. William 
Irving's testimony was as to instruction he had given to his tenant, Mr. Wilson, to attempt to 
keep people off of his property. He said no attempts were made to post signage on Middle Fork 
Road. David Cunningham testified not of posting signs but only as to seeing signs painted on 
rocks and on tires along Left Fork Road and at its junction with Middle Fork Road. Mr. 
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Simonsen claims that Jeffrey Simonsen was told by Mr. Wilson, then a lessee of the Defendant 
Property, to keep off Middle Fork Road. Memorandum p. 12. However, that conversation did 
not take place until after Defendants' acquisition of the Defendant Property and Jeffrey 
Simonsen5s testimony rather was that Mr. Wilson asked him to leave the "property" whereupon 
Mr. Simonsen showed him evidence of written permission to be on the property. (R. 81:44). 
There was no testimony that the conversation was in any way directed at Middle Fork Road. 
Mr. Simonsen declares that the placing of no trespass signs along what later became the 
Defendant Property was sufficient to require the trial court to conclude that Middle Fork Road 
had not been continuously used as a public thoroughfare. However, the uncontradicted evidence 
is that the road was and continued to be so used. The only persuasiveness to the Defendants' 
evidence regarding the no trespass postings was that certain of the property through which Left 
Fork Road passed and Middle Fork Road passed was private property, the owner of which was 
attempting to assure the users of the road would not leave the road and use the adjacent property. 
The uncontradicted evidence is that Left Fork Road was always used by the general public with 
no attempt to close or restrict its use. Notwithstanding, no trespass postings were placed along 
that road in the area what is now the Defendant Property. Obviously, the attempt was not to 
preclude use of the road but of the adjacent property. Similarly, the posting on what is now the 
Defendant Property at the Middle Fork Road junction with Left Fork Road could only be 
interpreted as attempts to keep road users on the road. 
Defendants' evidence also disregarded various U.S. Department of Interior and U.S. 
Department of Agricultural maps all of which clearly reflect the then general location and 
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continual existence of Middle Fork Road (Exhibits 4, 5, 9 and 10). They ignore the U.S. 
Department of Agricultural aerial photos of September 1984 and September 1998. (Exhibits 11 
and 12). The maps and aerial photos are persuasive evidence that Middle Fork Road existed, that 
its existence was of sufficient importance to be included in official mapping and that ongoing, 
continuous and substantial use was being made of the road generating a physical condition 
clearly observable. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Randy T. Simonsen, lacks standing to prosecute this appeal Further, he has 
failed to sufficiently marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding of public use of 
Middle Fork Road. The findings made and judgment entered March 10, 2003 by the Fourth 
Judicial District Court are not erroneous. Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
same. 
DATED this Q day of October, 2004. 
NIELSEN & SENIQ 
ftuyAj, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
S ttz day of October 2004,1 did cause a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed, United States mails, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Reed M. Richards, Esq. 
2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Defendants 
f^^^7 
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Gary A. Weston (#3435) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-1900 
Facsimile: (801)532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AWINC CORP., an Oklahoma 
coiporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY T. SIMONSEN; RANDY T. 
SIMONSEN, LTD., a limited partnership; 
and SIMLEW L.C., also known as 
SIMLEW, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled case was tried to the Court, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, sitting 
without a jury, on January 27, 28 and 29, 2003. Plaintiff, AWINC Corp., was represented by 
Gary A. Weston of the firm of Nielsen & Senior. Defendants, Randy T. Simonsen, Randy T. 
Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C., were represented by Clifford V. Dunn. The Court heard 
testimony of a number of witnesses and received a number of written exhibits. Being fully 
advised and pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 000500472 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about February 25, 1997, Plaintiff received and accepted a certain deed, 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 3, therein naming Plaintiff as grantee and describing property 
consisting of patented mining claims in Wasatch County, Utah ("Plaintiff Property"). A portion 
of the Plaintiff Property is located northeasterly of what is commonly known as Soldier Summit 
and which is in the Southeast 1/4 of Section 18, part of Section 17, and part of the South 1/2 of 
Section 8 in Township 10 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. 
2. In September 1995, Defendants, Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C., 
acquired certain land ("Defendant Property"), a portion of which is located in the North 1/2 of 
Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 7 East, and the North 1/2 of Section 18, Township 10 
South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. 
3. Both the Plaintiff Property and the Defendant Property lie adjacent to and are 
separated by United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service lands being within the 
boundaries of the Uinta National Forest, as shown by year 1975 Uinta National Forest map, 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 5, year 1993 Uinta National Forest Service map, Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit No. 9, and year 1998 United States Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey 
map, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 10. 
4. A portion of the Plaintiff Property lies easterly of the Defendant Property. 
Another portion of the Plaintiff Property lies southerly of the Defendant Property. 
5. A road commonly known as Left Fork Road ("Left Fork Road") extends along the 
general course of the White River and across a part of the Defendant Property extending from the 
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south boundary line of said property northwesterly to and across the west boundary line of the 
property. 
6. Both the Plaintiff Property and the Defendant Property are accessed by a certain 
unimproved mountain road sometimes called Middle Fork Road ("Middle Fork Road"), the 
general course of which is shown in part as a four-wheel drive road on the 1998 U.S. Geological 
Survey map, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 10, and which road a trial witness has outlined on said 
exhibit with a pink color line. The road is further shown on the 1993 Uinta National Forest 
Service map, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 9, in part as four-wheel drive Road 900 and in part as four-
wheel drive Road 218. The road is accessed at its far south end by Left Fork Road and at its 
north end by a U.S. Forest Service trail sometimes called Crossover Road. Middle Fork Road 
courses across a portion of both the Defendant Property and the Plaintiff Property and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
That currently existing unimproved mountain road, 10 feet in width, commencing 
at the intersection of Left Fork Road and what is sometimes known as Middle 
Fork Road, in Wasatch County, Utah, and which intersection is in either the 
Northeast 1/4 of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 7 East, or the Northwest 
1/4 of Section 18, Township 10 South, Range 8 East, SLB&M, and running 
northeasterly, then southeasterly, then southerly, then again southeasterly, and 
then again northeasterly across portions of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 
7 East and Sections 18, 17 and 8 of Township 10 South, Range 8 East, SLB&M, 
to the northerly boundary of the Plaintiff Property. 
7. In 1996 or 1997, Defendants erected and placed a metal gate across Middle Fork 
Road near to the road's intersection with Left Fork Road and as pictured in Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit No. 1 ("The Gate"). Continuously since that time, Defendants have maintained The Gate 
in a closed and locked condition, thereby prohibiting access through The Gate from and to 
Middle Fork Road except with permission of the Defendants. 
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8. In 1997, Defendants caused a fence to be constructed at a distance of 
approximately 200 feet on each side of The Gate. 
9. Defendants denied Plaintiff access through The Gate except upon the condition 
that Plaintiff relinquish any right to such access. 
10. In 1997, a fence wire drop gate ("Livestock Gate") was constructed by Mr. Don 
Blanchard, at the direction of the Defendants, across Middle Fork Road at the approximate 
location where the road crosses the easterly-most boundary of the Defendant Property. 
11. Commencing sometime in the time frame of the 1960s and continuing to the time 
of the September 1995 acquisition of the Defendant Property by Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and 
Simlew L.C., the Defendant Property or portions thereof were leased for sheep grazing purposes. 
One or more of those lessees had placed along Left Fork Road rocks and tires on which had been 
painted words declaring "No Trespass." Such were also placed in the general area where Middle 
Fork Road accessed Left Fork Road and upon Middle Fork Road in that general area, but did not 
prevent or halt public use of Middle Fork Road. 
12. Beginning in 1995 and continuing to the time of trial, Defendants posted the 
Defendant Property with signs declaring "No Trespass" and prohibited use of that portion of 
Middle Fork Road coursing across the Defendant Property, except with permission of the 
Defendants. 
13. Beginning in 1997 and continuing to the time of trial, the Plaintiff posted the 
Plaintiff Property with signs declaring "No Trespass." Plaintiff did not restrict use of Middle 
Fork Road as it crosses over the Plaintiff Property, but rather prohibited use of the adjacent 
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Plaintiff Property except by permission, which permission was from time to time given to various 
persons requesting permission to hunt wild game on the property. 
14. Cullen Goodwin, David Ellis, Fred Addis and Kenneth Earl, along with members 
of their respective families, drove motor vehicles along the entire length of Middle Fork Road 
while hunting, camping, wildlife viewing and sightseeing in the Soldier Summit mountain area. 
Cullen Goodwin and Fred Addis, with family members, so used the entire length of the road in 
1965 and each year thereafter until The Gate was erected. They used the road on numerous 
separate times each year beginning in the spring of the year and ending in October or November 
of each year. David Ellis began his use of the road with members of his family in 1977 or 1978 
and, until the placement of The Gate, drove motor vehicles along the entire length of the road on 
a number of separate occasions during the spring, summer and fall months of each year for 
sightseeing, camping and hunting. Kenneth Earl, with members of his family, began driving 
motor vehicles along the full length of the road in the 1970s. He made such use of the road four 
or five times each year thereafter until The Gate was placed. His first use was typically on the 
July 4lh weekend and his last in October of each year. 
15. Cullen Goodwin, David Ellis, Fred Addis and Kenneth Earl were members of the 
general public. They so used Middle Fork Road without ever asking permission or having been 
given permission for its use. They did not own property in the vicinity of Middle Fork Road nor 
in the Soldier Summit mountain area. While operating motor vehicles on the road, it was 
common for them to encounter other people not part of their particular group or party and who 
were operating motor vehicles along the road. Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Addis and Mr. Earl 
were never requested not to use the road nor were told that they could not use the road. They 
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operated pickup trucks in earlier years and, in later years, four-wheel ATV motor vehicles along 
the entire length of the road. None of them at anytime had seen a gate across Middle Fork Road 
prior to the erection of The Gate and the Livestock Gate. 
16. Immediately prior to the placement of The Gate and of the Livestock Gate, Middle 
Fork Road was both accessible and usable by motor vehicles. At two or three locations on the 
Plaintiff Property, towards the north end of the property, there was a steep grade in the road that 
made it difficult if not impossible for a two-wheel drive motor vehicle to drive northerly on those 
particular parts of the road. Those locations were accessible to use by four-wheel drive motor 
vehicles. All portions of the road were usable by both two-wheel drive and four-wheel drive 
vehicles moving down the road in a southerly direction. 
17. In the early 1990s, the United States Forest Service placed wood posts in Middle 
Fork Road at or northerly of the north boundary of the Plaintiff Property to restrict use to only 
motor trail bikes or four-wheel ATV motor vehicles on that portion of the road on Forest Service 
property and north of the Plaintiff Property. 
18. Defendants' purpose in maintaining The Gate in a closed and locked condition is 
to prevent use by the general public, including Plaintiff, of that portion of Middle Fork Road as 
described in Finding of Fact No. 6, which courses upon and across the Defendant Property. 
19. The Gate and the Livestock Gate prevented public use of that portion of Middle 
Fork Road as described in Finding of Fact No. 6 which courses on and over the Defendant 
Property. The gates prevented use of that part of the road by Plaintiff. 
20. Defendants continue to maintain The Gate in a locked condition and to refuse 
members of the general public and Plaintiff access through The Gate. 
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21. Members of the general public driving motor vehicles on Middle Fork Road did 
so openly and notoriously and the then owners of the Plaintiff Property and of the Defendant 
Property knew or should have known of said open and notorious use. 
22. Prior to the installation of The Gate, the general public had free and unlimited 
access and the ability to drive motor vehicles along the entire length of Middle Fork Road as 
limited by weather conditions. 
23. Persons using Middle Fork Road were not doing so pursuant to permission 
requested or obtained from owners of the Defendant Property or the Plaintiff Property. 
24. The general public has made use of Middle Fork Road as a public thoroughfare 
prior to the erection and placement of The Gate for a period of more than ten consecutive years. 
Said use was continuous during said period of time in that the public used the road whenever 
they found it necessary or convenient and use was limited only by prevailing weather conditions. 
25. Prior to placement of The Gate across Middle Fork Road, there was no motor 
vehicle use of any portion of Middle Fork Road, conditioned on permission granted. One Boyd 
Marsing did grant permission to some wild game hunters, but such use did not pertain to the 
Defendant Property or that portion of Middle Fork Road coursing across the Defendant Property. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is an Oklahoma corporation qualified to do business in the State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff is and has been the owner of the Plaintiff Property continuously since 
February 1997. 
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3. Plaintiff is the party responsible to prove that Middle Fork Road has been 
dedicated as a public thoroughfare. The showing must be by clear and convincing evidence. 
4. Prior to the placement of The Gate and of the Livestock Gate, Middle Fork Road 
had been used by the general public for a period of some 20 or more consecutive years for motor 
vehicle travel over its entire length and whenever members of the public found it necessary or 
convenient. 
5. Middle Fork Road is a public road dedicated and abandoned to the public in 
accordance with Section 72-5-104(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953, and its predecessor, Section 27-12-
89. Utah Code Ann.. 1953. 
6. Plaintiff has no claim against Defendants for a non-exclusive prescriptive 
easement as prayed under the Second Claim for Relief of its Amended Complaint, which claim is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Plaintiff, having provided no evidence of damages for trespass, has no claim 
against Defendants under the Third Claim for Relief of its Amended Complaint, which claim is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
8. Judgment should be entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants 
declaring, ordering and adjudging as follows: 
(a) Middle Fork Road, as described in Finding of Fact No. 6, is a public road 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public. 
(b) The Defendants shall forthwith remove or cause to be removed the lock 
from The Gate and no longer place any lock or device on The Gate that prohibits ingress 
and egress through The Gate by members of the public, including Plaintiff. Defendants 
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shall permit access through The Gate whenever and at such times as either necessary or 
convenient to members of the public, including Plaintiff. 
(c) A permanent injunction be issued enjoining Defendants, their grantees, 
successors, assigns, heirs, agents and invitees from maintaining The Gate or any other 
gate in or across Middle Fork Road, as described in Finding of Fact No. 6, in a closed and 
locked condition and from obstructing or preventing access by the public, including 
Plaintiff, to the use of Middle Fork Road as it courses on and over the Defendant 
Property. 
(d) For Plaintiff s costs herein incurred. 
Hi 
DATED this l[) day of March, 2003. 
BM THE COURT: 
\ if, 
£2-s *u& 
DON; , _»^~ 
DISTRICT COURT JUD A ^ ^ ^ Z ^ ^ 
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Gary A. Weston (#3435) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AWINC CORP., an Oklahoma 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY T. SIMONSEN; RANDY T. 
SIMONSEN, LTD., a limited partnership; 
and SIMLEW L.C., also known as 
SIMLEW, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Defendants. 
This case was tried to the Court, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, sitting without a jury, on 
January 27, 28 and 29, 2003. Plaintiff, AWINC Corp., was represented by Gary A. Weston of 
the firm of Nielsen & Senior. Defendants, Randy T. Simonsen, Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and 
Sinlew L.C., were represented by Clifford V. Dunn. On this date, the Court has entered herein its 
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000500472 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 
1. The currently existing unimproved mountain road, sometimes known as Middle 
Fork Road, and situated northerly of Soldier Summit in Wasatch County, Utah, is a public road 
dedicated and abandoned to the public in accordance with Section 72-5-104(1), Utah Code Ann.. 
1953, and its predecessor, Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Ann., 1953. Middle Fork Road is more 
particularly described as follows: 
That currently existing unimproved mountain road, 10 feet in width, commencing 
at the intersection of Left Fork Road and what is sometimes known as Middle 
Fork Road, in Wasatch County, Utah, and which intersection is in either the 
Northeast 1/4 of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 7 East, or the Northwest 
1/4 of Section 18, Township 10 South, Range 8 East, SLB&M, and running 
northeasterly, then southeasterly, then southerly, then again southeasterly, and 
then again northeasterly across portions of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 
7 East and Sections 18, 17 and 8 of Township 10 South, Range 8 East, SLB&M, 
to the northerly boundary of the property currently titled to AWINC Corp. 
2. The Defendants Randy T. Simonsen, Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C. 
shall forthwith remove or cause to be removed the lock on that certain gate currently placed and 
maintained across Middle Fork Road near to the road's intersection with Left Fork Road, 
northerly of Soldier Summit in Wasatch County, Utah. Said Defendants shall not place any other 
lock or locking device on the gate that prohibits ingress and egress through the gate by members 
of the public, including AWINC Corp., and shall permit access through the gate whenever and at 
such times as either necessary or convenient to members of the public, including AWINC Corp. 
3. A portion of Middle Fork Road courses across a portion of that certain property 
owned by Defendants Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C. and which property is situated 
in Wasatch County, Utah, a portion of which is located in the North 1/2 of Section 13, Township 
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10 South, Range 7 East, and the North 1/2 of Section 18, Township 10 South, Range 8 East, Salt 
Lake Base & Meridian. Defendants, Randy T. Simonsen, Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew 
L.C., their grantees, successors, assigns, heirs, agents and invitees be and hereby are perpetually 
and permanently enjoined and restrained from maintaining any gate in or across Middle Fork 
Road in a closed and locked condition and from obstructing or preventing access by the public, 
including AWINC Corp., to the use of Middle Fork Road as it courses on and over said property. 
4. Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief and Third Claim for Relief of its Amended 
Complaint are dismissed, with prejudice. 
5. Plaintiff shall have and recover judgment from Defendants for Plaintiffs costs 
incurred in this action 
DATED this 
h 
day ofF'ebruary, 2003. 
£y < '> *t: **> " W THE COURT 
, 7
 kVK* > ^ ' w ' ^ **3f \£ 
PqwALD J. E%&E 
\ ^ V ^ ^ j ^ f o ^ T f U C T COURT JUD^E 
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